ABSTRACT Silicon physical unclonable functions (PUFs) utilize the variation during silicon fabrication process to extract information that will be unique for each chip. There have been many recent approaches to how PUF can be used to improve security-related applications. However, it is well known that the fabrication variation has very strong spatial correlation 1 and this has been pointed out as a security threat to silicon PUF. In fact, when we apply NIST's statistical test suite for randomness against the random sequences generated from a population of 125 ring oscillator PUFs using classic 1-out-of-8 coding and neighbor coding, none of them can pass all the tests. In this paper, we propose to decouple the unwanted systematic variation from the desired random variation through a regression-based distiller, where the basic idea is to build a model for the systematic variation so we can generate the random sequences only from the true random variation. Applying neighbor coding to the same benchmark data, our experiment shows that second-and third-order polynomials distill random sequences that pass all the NIST randomness tests. So does fourth-order polynomial in the case of 1-out-of-8 coding. Finally, we introduce two generic random sequence generation methods. The sequences they generate fail all the randomness tests, but with the help of our proposed polynomial distiller, all but one tests are passed. These results demonstrate that our method can provide statistically random PUF information and thus bolster the security characteristics of existing PUF schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW
One of the most renowned principles for the design of a cryptosystem is Kerckhoffs's law: ''A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge (1883).'' In order to provide a secure storage for cryptographic keys, contemporary tamperresistant devices such as smart cards arm themselves with a number of countermeasures to defeat various kinds of invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive physical attacks. [6] - [11] . Nevertheless, it is still possible for attackers to read, and possibly write, the secret bits in the non-volatile memory through the electron beam of a Scanning Electron 1 Spatial correlations and systematic fabrication variations referred hereafter are different for each PUF.
Microscope (SEM) once the surface of the chip is exposed by, for instance, Focused Ion Beam (FIB) [12] , [13] . Physical unclonable functions (PUFs), in contrast, are 'inseparable' because the underlying nano-scale structural disorder will most likely be damaged during the course of physical tampering of the device, so will the keys [14] . Since the first introduction of PUFs in [15] , many types of circuitry have been proposed to realize the notion. Most notable are Arbiter PUFs [16] , [17] RO PUFs [3] , [16] and SRAM PUFs [18] , [19] . Many methodologies have been proposed to advance the art in terms of reliability, [4] , [5] , [20] , [21] security, [4] , [5] , [17] , [20] , [22] - [28] and hardware efficiency [5] , [20] , [21] , [29] - [31] .
Researchers further classify PUFs as 'Strong', 'Controlled', and 'Weak' mainly according to the number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) a PUF can generate, where the words weak and strong are irrelevant to the strength of PUF security [27] . Considering that a large number of CRPs can be achieved through a keyed hash function seeded by a Weak PUF, we chooses Weak PUFs as the context of the discussion, though the proposed methodology is expected to work well with Strong PUFs in a similar fashion. Figure 1 outlines the typical workflow of a Weak RO PUF that involves the following steps. 
1) FABRICATION VARIATION EXTRACTION
The very first task of PUFs is to measure the unique characteristics endowed from the uncontrollable fabrication process. The analog-to-digital transformation is part of the physical entropy source subject to tests and in our case, this step corresponds to a full frequency characterization of a RO array [2] .
2) SECRECY SELECTION
This step selects secure and reliable secrecy out of the variation profile measured in the previous step. Existing approaches include the classic 1-out-of-8 Coding [3] and its successor Index-Based Syndrome (IBS) Coding [4] , Chain-like Neighbor Coding [2] , [5] , [32] , TemperatureAware Cooperative (TAC) Coding [29] and Group-Based Coding [30] , [31] .
3) ERROR CORRECTION
In addition to the above error prevention methods, error correcting codes (ECC) are applied to further enhance reliability. Codes that have been used for RO PUFs include Hamming Code, BCH Code [3] , Repetition Code [4] , [21] , Reed-Muller Code [20] , [21] , and Kendall Syndrome Code [31] .
4) TESTS FOR RANDOMNESS AND RELIABILITY
The security aspects of the PUF secrect can be judged by its statistical characteristics or randomness. Reliability, on the other hand, can be gauged by placing the device under extreme conditions for secret regeneration and failure rate below 1 part per million (ppm) has been reported under severe fluctuation of ambient temperature and supply voltage [4] .
B. MOTIVATION
Many cryptography applications such as key generation require random numbers. NIST has established several standards for cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) as well as a statistical test suite for random and pseudo-random number generators [1] . If the numbers produced by a PRNG fail to pass the NIST test, it is considered vulnerable against cryptanalysis. Therefore, it is critical to verify that the secrecy generated by PUF is random and can pass the NIST test.
We consider the public available RO PUF data obtained from frequency characterization on 125 FPGA devices [2] . To our surprise, none of their random sequence can pass all the NIST tests that are applicable to their sequence length. Table 1 shows the detailed testing results. Column 1 lists the 9 statistical random tests we find applicable to the length of our test sequences. 2, 3 Take Frequency Test for example, it examines whether the number of 1's and 0's in a sequence are approximately the same as would be expected for a truly random sequence, for which the number of 1's and 0's in a sequence should be about the same. If a sequence has a very disproportional 1's to 0's such that its P-value, the probability for events that at least as extreme as this instance to occur, is smaller than a significant level α, 1% in our case, the event is regarded significant. If it turns out that more than 4% of the total test sequences are significant, the 'PROPORTION' of a test fails; otherwise, it passes. Furthermore, the P-values of all the test sequences are expected to be uniformly distributed. To examine this, each of the 9 tests also calculates the P-value of the P-values using the χ 2 statistic. The 'P-VALUE (OF P-VALUES)' of a test fails if the P-value of χ 2 is smaller than 0.0001; otherwise, it passes. Table 1 clearly indicates that none of the 125 PUF sequences can be deemed 'ideally random' and therefore cannot be used for critical cryptography applications. We will analyze why these PUF secrecy fails to pass the randomness tests in Section III. We argue that the systematic fabrication variation of the semiconductory process causes such failures. We study the architectures of the current RO PUFs and the aforementioned 4-step secret generation workflow. We propose to add one more step before the secret selection, which we refer to as entropy distillation, such that we can decouple the unwanted systematic variation from the desired stochastic variation.
C. CONTRIBUTION
There are three main contributions in this work. First, as we have pointed out in [33] , this is the first work that evaluates the randomness of the random sequences generated by different PUF schemes, before being randomized by means such as hashing, against the NIST standard test. As researchers have suspected, none of them can pass all the randomness tests (results are detailed in Section V). Second, we propose to decouple the unwanted systematic variation from the desired random variation through a regression-based distiller, and then generate the random sequences based on the desired random variation. Third, we describe how to design such regression-based distillers and show their effectiveness in enhancing the randomness of the random sequences. Indeed, with the help of our distillers, previously proposed PUF schemes are able to generate random sequences that can pass all the NIST tests.
We demonstrate our approach by the example of RO PUF, but the proposed method can be applied to other PUFs to enhance their security as well (of course, for those silicon PUFs that are more resistant to systematic variation, it will be less effective). As for the implementation of the proposed method, one can either implement the distiller with hardware or rely on a secure ALU for the data processing.
In the remainder of this paper, we will first introduce the basics on RO PUFs in Section II. We analyze the possible causes for the above randomness test failures in Section III. Then in Section IV, we elaborate our regression-based distiller which eliminates the systematic variation and thus fixes the randomness test failures. Finally, we report the detailed experimental results and conclude.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. BASICS ON RO PUF
A RO PUF extracts fabrication variations through comparing the frequencies of ring oscillators that are identically designed. As depicted in Figure 2 , the basic RO PUF consists of two ring oscillators, followed by two counters and one comparator at the end. When the start/stop control signal is asserted, the two ROs start to oscillate until the control signal is negated. The result of the race between the two ROs is determined by fabrication variations. During the course of the race, the two counters count the number of logic cycles run by the respective RO. At the end of race, the comparator outputs a binary result x based on the two counter values, say, To generate a secret in greater length, a RO PUF typically implements hundreds of ROs arranged in a 2-dimensional array. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the dataset we use implements ROs in 16 (columns) by 32 (rows) on each their 125 FPGAs [2] . 
B. 1-OUT-OF-8 CODING
The result of the race between the same two ROs may differ when the environmental conditions change. For example, a RO running faster than its peer at low temperature can actually be slower than the same peer at high temperature [3] . To prevent this, the 1-out-of-8 coding scheme uses a multiplexer to select the pair with the largest frequency difference out of 8 RO pairs as depicted in Figure 4 . For the two dimensional RO array illustrated in Figure 3 , we may generate one random bit for each row j from its 16 ROs RO 1,j . . . RO 16,j . However, in order to generate more random bits to better serve the statistical test purpose, we made a variation by forming two blocks (RO 1,j . . . RO 8,j ) and (RO 9,j . . . RO 16,j ) for each row. The 8 ROs in the same block are referenced by a 3-bit index: 000,001,010 . . . 111, and the index to the fastest RO is output as the random bits. This way we generate 6 random bits for each row. 
C. CHAIN-LIKE NEIGHBOR CODING
Another well-known pairing strategy is the chain-like neighbor coding, which consists of two design principles: 1) place ROs as close as possible and 2) pair ROs located adjacent to each other. In the two dimensional setting of Figure 3 , we may 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. FAILURE CAUSE 1: CHAIN DEPENDENCY
The high failure rate of the chain-like neighbor coding can be attributed to the non-independent comparison chain. Take 3 ROs RO A , RO B and RO C for example, two random bits are generated by comparing RO A with RO B and RO B with RO C . As we know, to pass NIST test for randomness, the random sequence is expected to demonstrate no significant deviation from the probability mass function (p.m.f) of tossing a fair coin twice, i.e., the 4 possible outcomes '00', '01', '10' and '11' are expected to occur equally with probability 1/4 is not the case for the two bits we generate from the 3 ROs. Let RO i also denote the running frequency of RO i . For three ROs, their running frequencies can have six different orders:
where each order happens with probability 1/6 when the running frequencies are random and identical and independent distributed (i.i.d.). According to Eqn. (1), both bits x AB and x BC will be equally likely to be '0' or '1'. However, the 2-bit data x AB x BC will be '00', '01', '10', and '11' with probabilities 1/6, 1/3, 1/3, and 1/6 respectively. This means that '01' or '10' occur twice as frequent as '00' or '11', clearly not the p.m.f. of the ideal random sequences.
A simple solution to fix this problem caused by the chain dependency is to break the chain such that each RO will only be paired with its neighbor once as follows: RO 2i ) . . .. We refer to this as decoupled neighbor coding. Apparently this is less efficient than the original chain-like neighbor coding. For example, when there are n ROs, the chain-like neighbor coding will generate n − 1 bits, but the decoupled neighbor coding can only generate n 2 bits. However, even with this hardware cost, we are unable to produce true random sequence. As the last two columns in Table 1 show, the decoupled neighbor coding scheme helps the original chain-like neighbor coding in passing four out of the nine 'P-VALUE (OF P-VALUES)' tests, and improves the 'PROPORTION' tests too. But it still fails half of the NIST statistical randomness tests.
B. FAILURE CAUSE 2: SPATIAL CORRELATION
Chain dependency does not exist in the 1-out-of-8 coding so to investigate the cause of the failures of the 1-out-of-8 coding, we investigate the raw data from the physical measurement of fabrication variation. Figure 5 shows how the fabrication variation of the semiconductor process portrays: the roughness of the surface (random variation) is superimposed upon a spatial trend (systematic variation). With the existence of systematic variation, the 'random' bits generated by RO PUF arrays may have very low min-entropy 4 , which means that they may not be secure for cryptographic purpose. For example, as we can see in Figure 5 , along the row (Y), the RO's frequency tends to increase as the Y index increases. Therefore, for the two bits x A1A2 and x B1B2 generated by two pairs of ROs (A1, A2) and (B1, B2), they are more likely to be '0' at the same time. Similarly, on a different die where the frequency tends to increase along the row (Y), these two bits are more likely to be '1' at the same time. This means that the systematic variation (the spatial correlation for two ROs on the same row (Y) in this case) will render the probability of x A1A2 = x B1B2 much higher than 0.5, making them not as random nor independent. While spatial correlation may explain the reason why none of the coding strategies in Table 1 passes all tests, it is interesting to note that in fact this threat has been reported in the chain-like neighbor coding, where they attempt to let the systematic effect cancel out with each other, extracting secrecy out of the random effect [5] . Similar principles have been used in [25] and [32] . However, the results we have in Table 1 indicate that such treatment is not sufficient to pass the NIST randomness tests. We postulate that a small remnant of the systematic variation can still be captured by the tests, causing the above failures. To illustrate this, we consider a hypothetical frequency characterization of 16 ROs as shown in Figure 6 . Based on the chain-like neighbor coding, these 16 ROs will generate the following 15-bit sequence: 1101,1110,1001,000. The first bit is a '1' because RO 1 < RO 2 and the third bit is a '0' because RO 3 > RO 4 , and so on. If our proposed decoupled neighbor coding is used, we will only have 8-bit data: 1011,1000. Although in both cases we have about the same number of 0's as the number of 1's, there is a clear trend that 1's are more likely to be in the first half of the sequence and the 0's in the second half. When we fit the frequencies into the curve in Figure 6 , we see clearly the systematic trend of 'going up slope' first and then 'going down slope', which causes 0's and 1's not distributed uniformly in the sequences. Finally, we mention that this systematic trend can stay undiscovered when one tallies the total number of 0's and 1's or calculates the interdie uniqueness via Hamming distance, e.g., 46.15-48.51% for RO PUFs [3] , [32] and 49.97% for SRAM PUFs [35] . 
IV. SYSTEMATIC VARIATION ELIMINATION
We believe that one of the main causes of the failures in randomness tests for the RO PUF generated sequences is the systematic process variation. We propose to model such variation and thus remove them to build RO PUF sequences based on the true random part of the process variation. This section shows how the proposed distillation process can strengthen the randomness of the PUF output. Due to its simplicity, we apply polynomial regression to model the systematic trend. Our simulation results show that this simple model is sufficiently good as it can fix all the failures of the 1-out-of-8 coding and the decoupled neighbor coding in Table 1 .
A. THE CAUSES OF PROCESS VARIATION
The semiconductor process variation has been modeled as the sum of a systematic component and a random component.
The systematic component attempts to capture a deterministic trend and other identifiable patterns through one or a collection of estimators. The main causes of the systematic variation can be attributed to equipment and process non-uniformity such as the focus shift of photolithography, the gradient of thermal annealing, dissimilar interactions between circuit layout and the chemical mechanical polishing process [36] , [37] .
The random component, on the other hand, accounts for the difference between the model estimates and the observed data; its constituents include atomic-level stochastic phenomena such as random dopant profiles, measurement errors and any unidentified patterns [37] , [38] . More discussion and related work on process variation modeling can be found in [39] .
It is important to clarify that our goal is not to build a new variation model. Indeed, the proposed distiller does not require the accuracy of the variation model to be as high as those for power or performance driven applications. In the rest of this section, we will illustrate how the distiller can improve PUF data's randomness using the simple polynomial regression model.
Let us first consider an example in Figure 7 . It reports the frequency information of the same 16 RO PUF as in Figure 6 except that the Y-axis now shows the difference between each RO's frequency and the systematic trend (the bell-shape curve in Figure 6 ). When we use the same chain-like neighbor coding, the 15-bit sequence becomes 0100,1010,1011,100. Compared to the original sequence 1101,1110,1001,000 in Figure 6 , we don't see the 'predictability' that there are more 1's in the first half and more 0's in the second half of the sequence. 
B. POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION
A k th -order polynomial regression is a form of linear regression in which the relationship between independent variables and a dependent variable by a polynomial of order k, where k is a non-negative integer. For a RO PUF with its m ROs arranged in r rows by c columns, the Cartesian coordinates (x, y) of ROs are regarded as two independent variables and the oscillating frequency z is the single variable dependent on x and y. In such a two dimensional setting, a polynomial regression model of order k takes the following general form
EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING
where 1 ≤ x ≤ c, 1 ≤ y ≤ r; z, β, ∈ R. On the right hand side of the equation, the summation term models the systematic variation at the physical location (v x , h y ) on a chip and the residual term k,x,y models the random variation. In the k th -order polynomial model, there will be m = c × r equations in the form of Eqn. (2) as 1 ≤ x ≤ c and 1 ≤ y ≤ r. The number of unknowns β k,i,j is n = (k+1)(k+2) 2 as 0 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ k. This results in an overdetermined system (i.e. m > n), which can be solved by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method.
Equivalently, we can rewrite this in the matrix form
where
. . .
And ω k,p,q 's are in the format of v x i−j h y j , where x = ((p − 1)
The OLS method will find the 'best' estimateβ in terms of the minimum sum of squared errors as Eqn. (4) indicates.
By taking partial directives of Eqn. (5) with respect to each β k,i,j and letting each gradient to zero, the solution of OLS can be expressed in the matrix form as in Eqn. (6) .
C. REGRESSION-BASED DISTILLER
When we apply polynomial regression models to capture the systematic variation trend, higher order models have better accuracy and generate smaller residual terms ( k,x,y 's in Eqn. (2)). While they may lead to sequences that are more random and secure, they incur more computational cost and more importantly, the small magnitude of the residual terms can cause difficulties in error correction phase and damage the efficiency of RO PUF. For example, Figure 8 shows the histograms of the random variation of a data set (see the result section for detailed description of the data) after regression models with polynomials of degrees 0 to 6 are applied.
Clearly we see as the order increases, the number of ROs whose frequencies are far from the center decreases quickly, yielding a smaller variance. Nevertheless, they all appear normal distribution and it is difficult to judge which model is the best choice without running the standard randomness tests. Therefore, our goal is to find the polynomial regression model in minimal order that can successfully distill the ideal random variation. We propose to conduct this distillation procedure after the 'fabrication variation extraction' phase. The remaining question is in the next 'secrecy selection' phase that how to build the RO PUF sequence based on the residual terms, or the true random variations. Suppose we have a 2-dimensional array of ROs placed in r rows and c columns (see Figure 3) , there are many ways to define RO PUF bits from the distilled RO frequency information. For example, in our implementation of the 1-outof-8 coding, each row generates c 8 × 3 bits; in the chain-like neighbor coding, we have c − 1 bits from each row; in the decoupled neighbor coding, this number reduces to c 2 . Of course, instead of focusing on each row, we can define RO PUF bits by comparing the ROs in the same column. In addition to these three coding schemes, we study the following two generic sequences, S and T , to gauge if there is still any trace of spatial correlation in the distilled random component: where in (7),
Intuitively, S and T are formulated by cutting each row (or column in T ) in the RO array into two equal halves, pairing up ROs in the two halves, and comparing their residual variation terms. Recall that the principle in neighbor coding is to pair up ROs that are next to each other in order to reduce the systematic variation. In S and T , we have purposely done the opposite to pair up ROs that are far from each other to amplify the effect of systematic variation in order to test the effectiveness of the proposed regression-based entropy distiller. In the next section, we will report our detailed findings on such randomness tests.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ON RANDOMNESS TESTS
In this section, we conduct standard NIST randomness tests to validate that the proposed regression-based entropy distiller will improve the randomness of the RO PUF sequences. We use the test bench in the public domain which consists of the frequency characterization of 125 RO PUFs implemented on 125 Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGAs, where 512 ROs were placed on each FPGA as shown Figure 3 [2] .
A. THE POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS
We first report the systematic variation distillation procedure and then results. For each chip, we apply regression models of different orders to its 512 averages of frequency readings. Figure 9 shows the modeled systematic variation for each RO on the first chip. In the 0 th order, the systematic variation is the average of the 512 averages. In the 1 st order linear model, we see that the ROs have higher frequency as their Y coordinates decrease. As we use higher order polynomials, it starts to show trend similar to Figure 5 . Figure 10 shows the random variation after distillation. We see the radial pattern close to the center for the 0 th and 1 st models, which is known as the 'bull's eye' and a clear indication of 'non-randomness'. However, it vanishes in the cases of 2 nd model and beyond. This suggests us that polynomials of 2 nd degree or higher should be used.
B. NIST RANDOMNESS TESTS
There are nine randomness tests in the NIST statistical test suite applicable to the length of our test sequences: Frequency Test, Block Frequency Test, Cumulative Sums Test (with block size m = 2 and m = 3), Runs Test, Longest Run Test, Serial Test (both forward and backward) and Approximate Entropy Test. According to [1] , empirical results have to be interpreted in two forms of analysis: First, the proportion of sequences passing a test shall be above a minimum rate, 0.96 in our case, i.e., to pass 120 sequences out of a sample size of 125 sequences at significance level α = 0.01. Secondly, the P-values of all the random sequences shall be uniformly distributed. Based on χ 2 Goodness-ofFit Test, the underlying distribution is deemed uniform if the P-value of the P-values is equal or greater than 0.0001 for a population of 125 sequences. Whenever either of these two approaches fails, further tests based on a different sample space will help clarify whether the failure is a statistical anomaly or a clear non-randomness. Table 2 reports the detailed test results on the generic S-sequence, T -sequence, and the sequences generated by the coding schemes of 1-out-of-8, chain-like neighbor, and decoupled neighbor.
EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING
1) S-SEQUENCE AND T -SEQUENCE
The 512 ROs will generate a 256-bit S-sequence and a 256-bit T -sequence. The S-sequence and T -sequence for NIST randomness test are 32000 bits long obtained by concatenating the 125 such 256-bit sequence from the 125 chips.
As the 0 th -order section shows, random sequences generated without entropy distillation fail miserably for both forms of analysis 'PROP. (PROPORTION)' and 'P-VAL. (P-VALUE OF P-VALUES)', where '*' marks a failure. This strongly suggests the existence of systematic variation in the raw data. The failure rate decreases sharply when applied VOLUME 2, NO. 2, JUNE 2014 P-VALUE of P-VALUES)' and 'PROP. (PROPORTION) ' analyses with respect to random sequences generated by S, T, the 1-out-of-8 coding, the chain-like neighbor coding and the decoupled neighbor coding accompanied by 0 th -to 6 th -order distillers, where '*' marks a failure.
with 1 st -, 2 nd -or 3 rd -order distiller in the case of S and with 2 nd -or 3 rd -order distiller in the case of T .
Unfortunately, there is at least one failure with respect to S, though the failure is only slightly below the cutting value. In such a boarder case where a weak existence of systematic variation is inferred, further investigation with different dataset is necessary to conclude the entropy source, i.e., RO PUF plus the distillation model, 'good' or 'bad'. If simply taking the sum of failure rates with respect to S and T , either 2 nd -or 3 rd -order distillers can be considered optimal.
Finally, we mention that the pass rate of the 'P-VALUE OF P-VALUES' analysis drops when applied with a model EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING of 4 th order or higher. A further investigation reveals that this is caused by model over-fitting. When we use high order models, there will be more coefficients β k,i,j (as in Eqn. (2)) to describe the underlying systematic variation. In general, this will give us better model. However, considering the limited number of data samples we have (a 256-bit S-sequence or a 256-bit T -sequence), if we use a 6 th order polynomial model where 28 unknown β k,i,j 's need to determined, the model will capture the random variation instead of the systematic variation and causes over-fitting. When that happens, there is little 'true' random variation left and thus randomness test will fail. We can see this from Table 2 . This result also indicates that the 2 nd or 3 rd order model should suffice with the number of data samples we have.
2) 1-OUT-OF-8 CODING
For our implementation of the 1-out-of-8 coding, a 3-bit index '000', '001'. . . or '111' is generated by pointing to the fastest RO out of 8 consecutive ROs on the same row, i.e., 192 bits per chip or 125 × 192 = 24000 bits for the test sequence.
From Table 2 , we see that the 1-out-of-8 coding does very well even without the entropy distillation with only one clear 'P-VALUE' failure and two marginal 'PROPORTION' failures. The best linear model can fix all these three failures, but introduced a different 'P-VALUE' failure which is marginal. Also, distillers of 4 th order and higher pass all the tests and can be deemed 'good'. However, the 2 nd and 3 rd order models fail about half of the tests. We suspect that this is caused by the fact that we are collecting three bits at a time from the 3-bit index of the eight ROs. Models of low order may not be able to captuer certain intrinsic correlation behind such selection.
3) NEIGHBOR CODING
In the case of the chain-like neighbor coding, 15 bits are generated per row by pairing up with row neighbors, which yields 480 bits per chip. Thus, the length of the test sequence is 125 × 480 = 60000 bits.
As shown in Table 2 , none of the polynomial distiller makes meaningful improvement. This phenomenon aligns with our expectation that the failures are caused by the intrinsic chain dependencies of the pairing strategy rather than spatial correlation. Moreover, consider our treatment to this problem, the decoupled neighbor coding, the 1 st order linear model is capable of helping it to pass all the randomness tests.
The over-fitting problem for high order polynomial models does not seem to be a concern in this case. The only exception is the 'LongestRun' test which is also the test that the 2 nd and 3 rd order models fail in the case of S-sequence. Considering the severe over-fitting problem in the case of S-sequence and T-sequence, we believe this is due to the structural difference between the decoupled neighbor coding and the S-or T-sequence. As we have discussed when defining the S-sequence and T-sequence, they are designed to amplify the systematic variation, so over-fitting is more likely to occur. In decoupled neighbor coding, we pair two ROs that are physically close to each other, hence they will have similar systematic variation that can be easily and accurately captured by the distillers. More detailed results can be found in [39] .
VI. CONCLUSION
The systematic component of fabrication variation has long posted a security threat to RO PUFs. This work provides experimental data to demonstrate that none of the current coding schemes can pass all the NIST randomness tests. To address the issue, we propose a family of entropy distillers based on polynomial regression. We affirm their effectiveness in improving the randomness of the PUF output.
